Disruptive Innovation: Amman’s Airport, Short-term Regressions, and Bright Futures

When they started computerizing the Jordanian passport issuing process, the “computer” line had a wait twice as long as that of the “manual” line. Today, no one could argue that we were better off with a non-computerized process for passports.

Queen Alia International Airport Overview

Folks, this is the future, and its for the better—like it or not. Transitions are never smooth, but if you think the new development is for the worse, you are decidedly mistaken.

Today, many are complaining that this huge investment is going to waste after witnessing some disappointments in the launch of the airport building. Luggage is arriving late at the baggage claims, people are being help up in security, and confusion is abundant regarding parking and transportation.

The old Airport

Truth is, huge transitions are always tumultuous. But the Airport International Group (AIG) has made a huge innovation, and they have shown (and are showing) great courage in their innovation.

There is something known as the innovator’s dilemma, and that can be explained as follows [1]:

  • A disruptive innovation initially offers lower performance than what the mainstream market historically demanded.
  • At the same time, it provides some new performance attributes, which in turn makes it prosper in a different market.
  • As it improves along the traditional parameters it eventually displaces traditional technology.

Examples of disruptive innovations are abundant. And I want to go over a few to make my point, then I’ll come back to the airport: Continue reading “Disruptive Innovation: Amman’s Airport, Short-term Regressions, and Bright Futures”

The Angry Arab Male: Where Democracy Fails

Today’s session of parliament in Jordan was an embarrassment—we saw typical examples of yelling over dialogue, insults over evidence, and anger over communication.

Whenever we witness the embarrassing behavior of our parliament, it is easy to think (or want to think) that such parliament could only be produced by corrupt elections, falsified votes, and manipulation from a group which wants a crippled parliament. We perhaps think that because it is too scary for us to even entertain the idea that we, the people, are capable of introducing—through popular will—an elected college of representatives that is as embarrassingly small-minded as these folks can be.

I do not believe this, and I think by ignoring the problem and waiting for a “proper election law” to come around, we would be overlooking the root problem of this small-minded violence.

To me, it seems very likely that the current parliament reflects the will of the people. After all, the embarrassing incidents in parliament mirror very closely other incidents of public violence that we witness–in particular, they mirror the unfortunate phenomenon of university violence which has been prevalent in many Jordanian institutions of higher learning in the last decades.

University violence and parliament’s small mindedness are both manifestations of the same problem of public societal violence. At the center of this problem is the “Angry Arab Male”.

The Angry Arab Male is an archetype prevalent in the Arab World of a man who thinks he has inherent superiority due to his genitalia. The Angry Arab Male believes power is more noble than intellect, a fist is more effective than a pen, and impulse is more important than thought. The Angry Arab Male likes to flex his muscles. He is always angry at others for insulting his imaginary ego and dignity, and retaliates by returning the favor. He is a believer that an eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth is the way the world ought to run.

The Angry Arab Male is more of a mythical figure than a common type of individual within society. But it is an archetype that romanticized and prevalent in the minds of many, as we look back to impressive figures in stories from older times, and the television of today.

The Angry Arab Male is Democracy’s biggest enemy, for his voice is always magnified, and his actions always poison the well for others. The Angry Arab Male is a poison that hinders our democratic development.

What is the antidote for this Problem? Truth be told, the Intellectual Arab Male can do very little. The only one who could really silence the Angry Arab Male is the Wise Arab Woman.

Over the past few years, we have seen an increasing number of female role models and public figures who have introduced a fresh maturity to politics and the public sphere. Ultimately, I believe it will be these women who will change the tone discourse in this country, and lead the boys to wake up from their cringe-worthy hissy fits.

 

[This post received a round of spell-checks after publication]

Some thoughts on the Anonymous/Hacktivist response to the Aaron Swartz tragedy

On Twitter, @AnonymousIRC claims to have been responsible for bringing the *.mit.edu network down for a few hours last night in protest of MIT’s legal “back-and-forth” with Aaron Swartz. Later on they went on to ‘hack’ two sub-domains in the MIT network (the “Cogeneration Project” and an RLE site, seemingly they just picked two random ones easy to break) posting a message about Aaron. Here are some of my thoughts about attacking the MIT network following this tragedy:

MIT has more than 10,000 students, researchers, and professors working on areas ranging from cancer research, renewable energy, and urban planning to free software (FSF), open internet (W3C), and the future of computing in general (CSAIL). In many ways, what MIT, as a community, stands for is more representative of the Swartz and Anon cause than the Anonymous themselves.

To think that bringing e-mail or a network down sent shivers down the spines of the MIT Corporation, General Counsel, or Administration is nonsense– all it did is harassed the student body and researchers. Those who are working on the same causes other groups are supposed to be working on.

Second, Hal Abelson is a fine man, co-founder of Creative Commons, close ally of Swartz, and an activist and champion for an open internet. Those who are cynical about his investigation know nothing about the man or the dynamics of this institution. Larry Lesisg himself, a great man (and co-founder of Creative Commons with Abelson, friend and mentor of Swartz), who yesterday called MIT’s interactions with Swartz “shameful” recognizes the fact that MIT’s response right now is a positive development, not a negative.

Third, no– bringing sites down is not a form of protest. Especially not when the collateral is the cause you are arguing for itself.

When will the hacker community mature to realize that they can harness their skills to achieve much better activism that does not hurt the people who are working on their same causes? The immaturity we initially saw in the likes of LulzSec has plagued anonymous for years now. Get it together.

“Islam is the Solution”: How Extremist Political Islam Feeds on the Failures of Secular Arabs

The revival of Islam as a political force in the 1970s is a sociopolitical phenomenon that is often difficult to understand. Much to the confusion of many, the Islamic resurgence took place after waves of modernization, secularism, and nationalism hit the Arab World. In this essay, I argue that extremist strands of both political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism have and continue to gain traction in the Arab world due to continued failures of the state: in the Arab Israeli conflict, in providing for its people, and in exercising sovereignty without foreign influence

Background

There are a number of terms that are relevant to the understanding of modern Islamist movements in the Arab World. Political Islam, or sometimes Islamism, refers to “Islam as a political ideology rather than as a religious or theological construct.” Political Islam can range from moderate to extreme, but in all cases, its adherents hold the belief that “Islam as a body of faith has something to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim world” (Ayoob, 2004, p. 1). Islamic fundamentalism is a closely related—but highly debated—term, describing a certain strand of political Islam. Islamic fundamentalism is often understood in the context of political Islam; indeed, many scholars use both terms interchangeably to indicate a religious-political belief that the return to the fundamentals of the Islamic tradition is the key to political and socioeconomic prosperity, following the failures of secular, modernist, and nationalist movements (Esposito, 2000, pp. 49-59).

Islamic fundamentalism can also be understood independent of Political Islam, as a belief advocating returning to the origins of Islam and the Islamic tradition from the days of the Prophets and the Righteous Caliphs. That is, a belief of Islamic revivalism that “advocates a return to what is perceived as a lost purity in religious practice”. Islamic fundamentalism contrasts with Islamic modernism, which does not rely on a literal interpretation of the Quran, instead seeking to preserve the spirit of the Quran in a modern social context (Andersen, et al., 2011, pp. 147-8).

Within Islamic fundamentalism, Islamic extremists refers to those “who would use violent or coercive means to implement a fundamentalist Islamic political agenda.” (Andersen, et al., 2011, p. 147) When discussing the rise and salience of Islamic fundamentalism, this essay will use a ‘liberal’ interpretation of the term to refer to extremist strand Islamic fundamentalism, consistent with common everyday use of the term. Furthermore, Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic extremism implicitly imply a belief in political Islam; this is understood by the origins of the modern Islamic revival.

Islamic Resurgence and Revival

Movements of political Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, and Islamic extremism, though not identical in meaning, are closely coupled and follow the same trends in terms of emergence, popularity, and spread. While Islamic fundamentalism is not new, political Islam is a modern phenomenon rooted in the sociopolitical conditions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Ayoob, 2004, p. 2). The rise of political Islam led to the rise (or, rebirth) of the rest of the spectrum of Islamist movements, including fundamentalism and extremism. This is because as political Islam gained traction, its adherents followed contending beliefs in realizing its vision. The rise of political Islam, and therefore the rebirth of the entire spectrum of movements into mainstream social and political circles, took places in what is known as the Islamic revival or resurgence, taking place in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Esposito, 2000, p. 50).

Some believe that “there is a connection between the decline of Arab unity as a symbol and the rise of Political Islam.” Indeed, “as Arab unity was becoming increasingly discredited through the years, especially after 1967, new paths were sought.” (Andersen, et al., 2011, pp. 77-8). In the same spirit as my main thesis, I argue that the birth of political Islam was indeed a result of the failures of the secular Arab state.

A series of crises since the late 1960s has discredited many regimes and Western inspired modernization paradigms, triggering the politics of protest and a quest for greater authenticity. The resulting call for an Islamic alternative has been reflected in slogans such as “Islam is the solution” and “Neither West nor East.” —John Esposito, (Esposito, 2000, p. 50)

Beginning with the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, the failures of Arab Nationalism and Secularism frustrated many Arabs. Further events, including the growth of armed resistance the Arab-Israeli conflict, sectarian conflict in the Lebanese civil war, and the success of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution all contributed to discredit secularism and modernism, in favor of an Islamic movement. Indeed, Esposito argues that “modernism has been perceived as a form of neocolonialism, an evil that supplants religious and cultural identity”  (Esposito, 2000, p. 50).

Continue reading ““Islam is the Solution”: How Extremist Political Islam Feeds on the Failures of Secular Arabs”

Conflict Begets Conflict: the evolution of Arab attitudes, policies, and strategies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Since its beginnings, the Arab-Israeli Conflict has been through several phases of distinctive characteristic foreign policies, political attitudes, and strategies. Through a number of monumental defining events—including the major wars—shifts in policies, strategies, and attitude took place, marking transition between these phases. In this essay, I argue that the climate of the Arab-Israeli Conflict can be characterized by four historic phases after an initial period of indecision: Arab Nationalism and Defiance, Resistance and Refusal, Palestinian Armed Resistance, and then a Phase of Contradictions, starring two Arab camps with a widening gap, one entering the Peace, Negotiation, and Reconciliation phase, and the other entering the Islamic Resistance phase.

Background: Setting the Stage

The Palestine Question was a concern to the Middle East and International Community since the 1920s. The Arab response to the Zionist movement wad under debate in the period, and was first solidified in 1948 with the Israeli Declaration of Independence and the Arab War the next day.

Contending Visions

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Arab intellectuals responded differently to the Jewish immigration movement, Zionism, and news of the Balfour Declaration.

One camp of Arabs was the Hashemites, who had aspirations for a unified pan-Arab Kingdom. Faisal is a noteworthy example; writing that Arabs and Jews are “cousins in race”, and stating he “looks with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement.” (Friedman, 2000, p. 228) Furthermore, in Article III of the Faisal-Weizmann Agreement of 1919, Faisal, as the representative of the Arabs, agrees to the Balfour Declaration, and commits to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, “provided the Arabs obtain their independence as demanded […]” (Smith, 2009, pp. 98-9).

Other Arab nationalists, however, viewed Faisal as a traitor for “abandoning Palestine”. Though Smith points out that Faisal’s agreement was based on the fact that “the Jews did not propose to set up a government of their own but wished to work under British protection to colonize and develop Palestine without encroaching on any legitimate interests.”  (Smith, 2009, p. 78) Indeed, Balfour’s vague statement promised the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, not to reconstitute Palestine as a Jewish state.

Still, other Arab Nationalists vehemently opposed such discourse with Zionists. Many clashes within Palestine took place between Arab and Jewish groups over considerations including land, freedom of religion, and an Arab belief that the Zionists and Jews were encroaching on their rights. Such clashes began with the Western Wall Riots of 1929 (Smith, 2009, p. 129).

Within Palestine, two distinctive families of urban notables lead public opinion. One such family with the Nashashibis, a wealthy and notable family of Jerusalem that included, amongst others, Raghib Nashashibi, who was the Mayor of Jerusalem between 1920 and 1934 (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d.). The Nashashibis were known to be friendlier to the Jewish communities and more flexible in terms of dealing with Zionism, compared to other groups (Smith, 2009, p. 113).

Another family is the Husseinis, of whom Hajj Amin Al-Husseini was the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Husseini opposed Nashashibi and was more anti-Zionist in sentiment. Husseini continued to drift away from Nashashibi’s attitude, eventually forging a relationship with German Nazi Leader Adolf Hitler, and adopting a similar, albeit more dilute, anti-Semitic rhetoric. (Smith, 2009, p. 176)

Continue reading “Conflict Begets Conflict: the evolution of Arab attitudes, policies, and strategies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict”

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